Dennis Hackethal
@dennis.hackethal·Joined Jun 2024·Ideas
Founder Veritula.
Author. Software engineer. Ex Apple. Translator of The Beginning of Infinity.
dennishackethal.com
#5426·Dennis HackethalOP revised 17 days agoNeil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
I reply:
The word “reliably” refers to the claim in BoI that ppl search for HTV explanations “systematically”; that they follow some yet-to-be-specified system to form preferences this way.
The system/program, being man-made, would of course be fallible. Still, since BoI says HTV is at the heart of all rational endeavors, the system must be universal. Hence the requirement for any pair.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
#5420·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoNot a mathematician but AFAIK, Hilbert basically asked if we could make a machine that answers every math question correctly. The answer to that is ‘no’. But an algorithm for rational decision-making isn’t about that.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
I also reply that it needs to rank any pair, not every pair.
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task.
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task. I say this in my reply.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Not a mathematician but AFAIK, Hilbert basically asked if we could make a machine that answers every math question correctly. The answer to that is ‘no’. But an algorithm for rational decision-making isn’t about that.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
#5417·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoBrett says “Rational decision making is not a matter of pulling a lever and cranking through a calculation.”
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Brett says “Rational decision making is not a matter of pulling a lever and cranking through a calculation.”
#5415·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoBrett says the bounty is “impossible” because “it’s asking for a definition for something that *cannot be defined* in the way the challenge demands.”
Dirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):
What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them…
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):
What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them… You will fail.
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):
What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them…
#5365·Dennis HackethalOP, 19 days agoI don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)
Citation needed. You of all people should know to cite since you hate when others cite from memory. Don’t be a hypocrite.
I reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
I reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
I later found more evidence running a word search for the string ‘prefer’:
“Whenever a wide range of variant theories can account equally well for the phenomenon they are trying to explain, there is no reason to prefer one of them over the others, so advocating a particular one in preference to the others is irrational.” (21, emphasis mine)
And chapter 13 is virtually all about forming rational preferences.
Then there’s TCS common-preference finding…
#5330·Dennis HackethalOP, 21 days agoBrett Hall says Newtonian physics has pending criticisms but we can adopt it rationally in many situations so my criterion of rationality must be false.
Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.
#5398·Dennis HackethalOP, 18 days agoTyler says “All known programs to date” outsource creative input to the user.
I reply that “Not all programs prompt users for input at runtime”
#5333·Dennis HackethalOP, 21 days agoAs I wrote to him in response, rationality and creativity are different things. They’re related, and there’s overlap, but you don’t need to code creativity to code rational preference formation. You can outsource creative input to the user, as programs usually do.
Tyler says “All known programs to date” outsource creative input to the user.
This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
#5384·Benjamin Davies, 18 days agoThis is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
Quote missing italics.
Remove outdated child
I read “two strings” literally. The strings are the only case-specific inputs. A fact read from a database, sensor, or anywhere else is another input, whether or not it appears in the function signature.
No function of those two strings can always provide such a ranking.
The bounty says the code must accept two strings as input. It doesn’t say only or at most or exactly two. But I see now that this may not have been clear – if you think it’ll help, I can edit the bounty to say ‘at least two’.
Also, when I wrote the bounty, I meant input as in ‘part of the function signature’. If the function body later reads from a database or prompts the user for input, that doesn’t in and of itself disqualify the submission.
I read “two strings” literally. The strings are the only case-specific inputs. A fact read from a database, sensor, or anywhere else is another input, whether or not it appears in the function signature.
No function of those two strings can always provide such a ranking.
The bounty says the code must accept two strings as input. It doesn’t say only or at most or exactly two. But I see now that this may not have been clear – if you think it’ll help, I can edit the bounty to say ‘at least two’.
Also, when I wrote the bounty, I meant input as in ‘part of the function signature’. If the function body later reads from a database or prompts the user for input, that doesn’t in and of itself disqualify the submission.
… we cannot avoid guesswork about which changes preserve meaning …
If a good-faith submission prompted the user for answers about changes in meaning or other creative input (within reason), that also would not automatically disqualify the submission. (The proviso “within reason” matters or else bad actors will simply prompt the user to tell the program which explanation is harder to vary. As with all other bounties, any submission will have to meet not just the bounty terms but survive all criticism it may get.)
Here also, I can edit the bounty to clarify that user input at runtime is permissible.
I hope I’ve addressed all reasons the bounty might not be doable, but let me know if I missed something.