Knut Sondre Sæbø
@knut-sondre-saebo·Joined Sep 2024·Ideas
#3634·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 months ago…cannot be reduced to explicit reasons…
Favoring explicit ideas over inexplicit ones is an example of irrationality.
How do you evaluate an implicit idea rationally?
#3632·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 months agoYou cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
That isn’t what I mean by unity of knowledge. Of course we can’t process our knowledge in its totality at once. That’s necessarily piecemeal. But that doesn’t mean we can’t live a life guided by reason.
If you consider riding a bike an example of irrationality, and reasoning through quantum mechanics an example of rationality, then you haven’t understood Deutsch’s/my stance on rationality. I think you should study it, ask more questions about it, before you’re ready to criticize it.
There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reasoning?
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
Even if knowledge is unified at some fundamental level, we might not be able to live by means of this unified knowledge alone (because of how we function or pure complexity). Living life might require operating through other «kinds» of knowledge which are pre- cognitive. You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
#3605·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 months agoCalling people “embodied agent[s]” like they’re barely superior to video-game characters is dehumanizing and weird.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3609·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoperspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns. Maybe something about perception?
Fixed it. I meant to write perspectival knowledge, whcih is a term used in cognitive science.
Correction to criticism 3604
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
#215·Dennis HackethalOP, almost 2 years agoAnything that processes information is a computer.
The brain processes information.
Therefore, the brain is a computer.
I think you run into circular dependence if you exhaustively try to account for brain function by information processing. Even Claud Shannon’s definition of information is dependent upon a «mind/perspective» defining a range of possible states. The world devoid of any perspective would have infinite states and systems depending on how you «view the world». An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) Three body problem. This computation is dependent on a mind defining states and logical relations.
Will move this criticism as a criticism of the main idea, since it is a criticism of the first premise.
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
#513·Dennis HackethalOP, over 1 year agoYes re OR gate.
Re light switches: as I understand it, they either inhibit or permit the flow of electricity. But there’s no information there, let alone processing of information. So the example is flawed, I think.
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
#1204·Dennis HackethalOP revised over 1 year agoI agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
I know. But we don’t don't know if consciousness can emerge as a byproduct of computation, so I think Rands distinction is useful until proven false. Programs run according to their rules, while consciousness seems to transcend "its own rules", which is why it can be creative. To create rules with self-awareness isn’t an incremental improvement that logically follows from what we know of rules and programs today (as I can see it). I see there was another thread on this topic though, so I’ll go in and drop my comments there!
#744·Dennis HackethalOP revised over 1 year agoMy conjecture
Conjecture: addiction is the result of the entrenchment of a conflict between two or more preferences in a mind.
Picture a smoker who wants to give up smoking but also really enjoys smoking. Those preferences conflict.
If the conflict is entrenched, then both preferences get to live on indefinitely. The entrenchment will not let the smoker give up smoking. He will become a chain smoker.
There is a similar (identical?) theory put forward by Marc Lewis in Biology of desire. He explains addiction as the process of "reciprocal narrowing". The process of reciprocal narrowing does not remove conflicting desires, but instead reinforces a pattern of dealing with conflict through a progressively narrower, habitual response (substance, action, mental dissociation). Addiction, therefore, as you suggested, is a process of managing the "conflict between two or more preferences within the mind.
#1194·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised over 1 year agoWhat do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.
I think this explanation holds if you assume the law of the excluded middle is true. The only remaining criticism I can see, is if you throw out the law of the excluded middle (like paraconsistent- and intutionist logic.)
#525·Dennis HackethalOP revised over 1 year agoI don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.