Can qualia be separated from personhood?
#4789·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoBy the Church-Turing Thesis, all computation can be specified/programmed. So the evolutionary aspect of a person can be specified/programmed, if it is computational.
Programs could be evolved non-computationally. But that process could itself still be simulated, per the Church-Turing-Deutsch Thesis.
#4757·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoIs all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?
By the Church-Turing Thesis, all computation can be specified/programmed. So the evolutionary aspect of a person can be specified/programmed, if it is computational.
#4786·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoBut why would the system ever re-evolve to the satisfaction of a niche already satisfied previously? If the programs evolved by the evolutionary aspect of the person already exist, there is no more need for evolution of them.
The system may not have perfect knowledge of all programs present in it. The repeated independent emergence of winged flight in the biosphere comes to mind.
#4786·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoBut why would the system ever re-evolve to the satisfaction of a niche already satisfied previously? If the programs evolved by the evolutionary aspect of the person already exist, there is no more need for evolution of them.
Because programs present in the system at one time could be no longer present at another time. Previously well-adapted programs could have decayed, been destroyed or consumed. So the same evolutionary path (approximately or not) could be travelled again, in principle.
#4785·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoActually this is not implied. One experience and an identical later one could be caused by the same program(s) being run again at a later time; if the program which is identical to the given experience is part of an "evolutionary personhood program", that still qualifies: If the second experience is identical, under the above solution that just means that the exact same evolutionary steps are taken in the second case. Maybe this would virtually never happen, but poses no problem of principle.
But why would the system ever re-evolve to the satisfaction of a niche already satisfied previously? If the programs evolved by the evolutionary aspect of the person already exist, there is no more need for evolution of them.
#4756·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoThis implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
Actually this is not implied. One experience and an identical later one could be caused by the same program(s) being run again at a later time; if the program which is identical to the given experience is part of an "evolutionary personhood program", that still qualifies: If the second experience is identical, under the above solution that just means that the exact same evolutionary steps are taken in the second case. Maybe this would virtually never happen, but poses no problem of principle.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain way (by a person).
#4756·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoThis implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?
#4751·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoSOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.
This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
#4748·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoPROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.
#4749·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoSOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.
#4748·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month agoPROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
#4747·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
#4746·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.
(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.
#4745·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.
(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.
#4743·Tyler MillsOP revised about 1 month ago(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.
(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
Assumption A1: Only programs that are people while running constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.
#4738·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
#4737·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.
(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.
#4736·Tyler MillsOP, about 1 month ago(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.
(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.
Can a program which is not a person constitute an experience?
Imagine you are in a pitch black room. Before your eyes, a spotlight illuminates an apple for 5 seconds before darkness returns. Among other things, your mind will render the image of the apple for the 5 seconds, then it will not (afterimages aside). Assume the physical stimulus is identical for the whole 5 seconds.
Itemized discussion below.
(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.