Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

  Knut Sondre Sæbø addressed criticism #1204.

I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.

Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.

Or am I missing something?

#1204·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months ago

I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised idea #1193. The revision addresses idea #1132.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #1194.

What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

#1194·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 10 months ago

@knut-sondre-saebo, you write in the explanation for this revision:

I think the the law of excluded middle is more a property or constraint of existence, rather than a cause. Since we can treat universe as being something as a given, the reason it can't be something else is because the law of excluded middle constrains it to be what it is.

Revision explanations are meant to be short, eg ‘Fixed typo’ or ‘Clarified x’. Since the quote above contradicts #521, it might be worth submitting it as a criticism of #521, or as a separate idea. It doesn’t really work as a revision because revisions are for incremental changes, not for introducing contradictions.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on criticism #1195.

Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.

#1195·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 10 months ago

💯

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #1203.

I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.

Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.

Or am I missing something?

I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.

Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.

Or am I missing something?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #1156.

If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.

#1156·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 10 months ago

I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.

Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.

Or am I missing something?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #1194.

What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

#1194·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 10 months ago

[…] it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist.

That isn’t a sentence.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #1132.

Nothingness as a qunatifier

Typo. Consider revising your idea to resolve this criticism.

#1132·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 months ago

Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #1131. The revision addresses idea #1198.

Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?

Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #1131.

Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?

#1131·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 months ago

The quote is now outdated.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø commented on idea #1194.

What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

#1194·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 10 months ago

I think this explanation holds if you assume the law of the excluded middle is true. The only remaining criticism I can see, is if you throw out the law of the excluded middle (like paraconsistent- and intutionist logic.)

  Knut Sondre Sæbø addressed criticism #525.

I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.

If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.

(Logan Chipkin)

#525·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 year ago

Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised idea #521.

I think the the law of excluded middle is more a property or constraint of existence, rather than a cause. Since we can treat universe as being something as a given, the reason it can't be something else is because the law of excluded middle constrains it to be what it is.


What do you think of: it’s the law of the excluded middle that causes the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised idea #1127.

Typo fixed


A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø addressed criticism #1131.

Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?

#1131·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 months ago

If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #1127.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

#1127·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 10 months ago

Nothingness as a qunatifier

Typo. Consider revising your idea to resolve this criticism.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #1127.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

#1127·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 10 months ago

Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised idea #1126.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø commented on idea #531.

Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.

(Logan Chipkin)

#531·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 year ago

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #1090. The revision addresses idea #519.

Sounds like she treats existence or nature as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.

Sounds like she treats existence or nature or the law of identity as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #518. The revision addresses idea #1060.

Sounds like she treats existence as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.

Sounds like she treats existence or nature as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #518.

Sounds like she treats existence as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.

#518·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 year ago

Not existence but maybe the law of identity.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #1058.

She does explain it by referring to the law of identity.

#1058·Dennis HackethalOP, 11 months ago

She only says that the law of identify rules nature, not that it explains nature’s existence.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #517.

I disagree. Existence is something to be explained.

(Logan Chipkin)

#517·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 year ago

She does explain it by referring to the law of identity.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on idea #521.

What do you think of: it’s the law of the excluded middle that causes the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.

#521·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 year ago

Since the law of the excluded middle is a corollary of the law of identity, Rand kind of implies this idea when she says that nature “is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity.”