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#3509·Dennis HackethalOP, about 14 hours agoHayek writes:
[P]rices can act to coördinate [sic] the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of his plan.
Hayek argues that any one man always knows very little about the economy as a whole. But the price system will tell him the little he does need to know.
I wonder how far the similarities between the economy and a single mind go. If the price system is a way for parts of a decentralized system to communicate, and the mind is a decentralized system, does the mind have something like a price system for its different parts to communicate?
A mind is vast, full of ideas. Any part of it always knows very little about the rest. In this sense, ideas in a mind are like men in an economy. So how do these ideas coordinate efficiently? Do emotions act like a price system inside the mind? Ayn Rand writes:
Emotions are the automatic results of man's value judgments integrated by his subconscious; emotions are estimates of that which furthers man's values or threatens them, that which is for him or against him—lightning calculators giving him the sum of his profit or loss.
The fun criterion is surely relevant in this context, too. Hayek writes that a rational economic order is about “conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans with those of others.” That sounds like common-preference finding, which essentially works the same across minds as it does within a single mind.
Are prices inside the mind involved in finding common preferences?
If … the mind is a decentralized system, does the mind have something like a price system for its different parts to communicate?
But the mind isn’t a decentralized system. It has a central ‘I’ sitting at the top. So it’s more like a company with a CEO than a fully decentralized system.
Hayek was a terrible writer. Convoluted, hard to understand.
For example, as quoted by Twitter account F. A. Hayek Quotes:
The more a man indulges in the propensity to blame others or circumstances for his failures, the more disgruntled and ineffective he tends to become.
He could have just said ‘blaming others makes you unhappy and weak’. But he chose complicated language, presumably to impress people.
Makes me think he didn’t have much of substance to say.
He was also sloppy at quoting: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/investigating-hayek-s-misquotes
Original article: https://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html
My simplified ‘translation’: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hayek-s-the-use-of-knowledge-in-society-simp
Mirror: https://open.substack.com/pub/hackethal/p/hayeks-the-use-of-knowledge-in-society
#3509·Dennis HackethalOP, about 14 hours agoHayek writes:
[P]rices can act to coördinate [sic] the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of his plan.
Hayek argues that any one man always knows very little about the economy as a whole. But the price system will tell him the little he does need to know.
I wonder how far the similarities between the economy and a single mind go. If the price system is a way for parts of a decentralized system to communicate, and the mind is a decentralized system, does the mind have something like a price system for its different parts to communicate?
A mind is vast, full of ideas. Any part of it always knows very little about the rest. In this sense, ideas in a mind are like men in an economy. So how do these ideas coordinate efficiently? Do emotions act like a price system inside the mind? Ayn Rand writes:
Emotions are the automatic results of man's value judgments integrated by his subconscious; emotions are estimates of that which furthers man's values or threatens them, that which is for him or against him—lightning calculators giving him the sum of his profit or loss.
The fun criterion is surely relevant in this context, too. Hayek writes that a rational economic order is about “conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans with those of others.” That sounds like common-preference finding, which essentially works the same across minds as it does within a single mind.
Are prices inside the mind involved in finding common preferences?
In our book club today, @erik-orrje raised the issue of split personalities.
I’m wildly speculating here, but I wonder if split personalities could be the result of the price mechanism inside a mind being broken.
If the price mechanism is needed for different parts of the mind to communicate with each other, and this mechanism breaks down somehow, then the parts become isolated.
Hayek writes:
[P]rices can act to coördinate [sic] the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of his plan.
Hayek argues that any one man always knows very little about the economy as a whole. But the price system will tell him the little he does need to know.
I wonder how far the similarities between the economy and a single mind go. If the price system is a way for parts of a decentralized system to communicate, and the mind is a decentralized system, does the mind have something like a price system for its different parts to communicate?
A mind is vast, full of ideas. Any part of it always knows very little about the rest. In this sense, ideas in a mind are like men in an economy. So how do these ideas coordinate efficiently? Do emotions act like a price system inside the mind? Ayn Rand writes:
Emotions are the automatic results of man's value judgments integrated by his subconscious; emotions are estimates of that which furthers man's values or threatens them, that which is for him or against him—lightning calculators giving him the sum of his profit or loss.
The fun criterion is surely relevant in this context, too. Hayek writes that a rational economic order is about “conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans with those of others.” That sounds like common-preference finding, which essentially works the same across minds as it does within a single mind.
Are prices inside the mind involved in finding common preferences?
Dennis Hackethal updated discussion ‘Hayek’s ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ – Simplified’.
The ‘About’ section changed as follows:
Dennis Hackethal updated discussion ‘Hard to Vary or Hardly Usable?’.
The ‘About’ section changed as follows:
#3504·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days agoLet’s say somebody starts a bounty with permissive terms, asking for virtually any kind of criticism. They set a high ceiling, hoping for many submissions. $200, say.
If they only end up getting one or two small criticisms, for typos, say, they won’t like having to pay 100 bucks a pop.
In other words, the few criticisms you end up getting may not be worth the ceiling.
In a future iteration, the user could additionally set a per-criticism ceiling. Which the site would recommend setting when using permissive terms.
This way, the user could set a total budget of $200, say, while capping each criticism at $30, for example. The first 6 eligible criticisms would each get $30, and the next one would get $20. The remaining criticisms would get nothing.
This approach effectively merges #3474 and #3472, giving users maximum flexibility to choose the best outcome depending on what kinds of criticism they anticipate getting based on their terms.
#3474·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoRather than set a fixed amount for each pending criticism (#3421), the ceiling could be divided among all pending criticisms equally.
Let’s say somebody starts a bounty with permissive terms, asking for virtually any kind of criticism. They set a high ceiling, hoping for many submissions. $200, say.
If they only end up getting one or two small criticisms, for typos, say, they won’t like having to pay 100 bucks a pop.
In other words, the few criticisms you end up getting may not be worth the ceiling.
#3502·Erik Orrje, 4 days agoI see, interesting. If only empirical fields can correspond to facts/truth, isn't that a form of empiricism?
I don’t think so, no.
The BoI chapter 1 glossary defines empiricism as “The misconception that we ‘derive’ all our knowledge from sensory experience.” I’m not saying empirical fields derive knowledge from sensory experience.
There’s a difference between ‘empiricism’ and ‘empirical’.
#3472·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoThe initiator of the bounty could choose a ceiling for the total they are willing to spend. They could additionally specify the amount per pending criticism.
For example, a user would indicate that they are willing to spend a total of $100 at $10 per criticism.
This approach is more complex for the bounty initiator than just indicating a total amount they are willing to spend (#3474). It’s best not to require users to do math.
#3430·Dennis HackethalOP, 6 days agoBut that would mean that the first criticism receives a payout at the same time the last criticism receives a payout. That creates an incentive to ignore new bounties in favor of older ones.
Given the need for a deadline, all critics get paid at the same time anyway.
#3498·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoThen it’s less clear to contributors how much money they can expect.
There could be a UI component showing estimated payout based on current number of criticisms, with a warning that actual payout could be less.
#3474·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoRather than set a fixed amount for each pending criticism (#3421), the ceiling could be divided among all pending criticisms equally.
Then it’s less clear to contributors how much money they can expect.
#3467·Dennis HackethalOP, 6 days agoThat could result in amounts too small to cover transaction costs.
Could pay out to only first x criticisms, where x is small enough the payout for each criticism is high enough to cover transaction costs (and then some).
#3486·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoNeed to address the risk of the initiator himself being a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.
I can roll out the feature to a few trusted users. Then I can reevaluate later with more experience to judge actual risks rather than speculate ahead of time.
Need to address the risk of people submitting arbitrary counter-criticisms just before the deadline to exclude criticisms from the bounty.
The grace period for the initiator unfortunately does not address this risk since he may decide not to review problematic criticisms.
Need to address the risk of people submitting arbitrary counter-criticisms just before the deadline to exclude competing criticisms from the bounty.
The grace period for the initiator unfortunately does not address this risk since he may decide not to review problematic criticisms.
#3490·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoNeed to address the risk of people submitting arbitrary counter-criticisms just before the deadline to exclude criticisms from the bounty.
The grace period for the initiator unfortunately does not address this risk since he may decide not to review problematic criticisms.
See #3452. Other critics have an incentive to report abuse. People found to abuse deadlines could become ineligible for payouts and excluded from participating in future bounties.
#3486·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoNeed to address the risk of the initiator himself being a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.
A modification of #2513 could work. Say you start a bounty. Your card is authorized for twice the ceiling. If you’re a good citizen, you’ll be charged the ceiling, at most. But if you’re found to submit arbitrary criticisms to avoid paying, your card is charged the full authorization. Admins can even decide to stop the bounty early if they detect abuse before the grace period beings.
Need to address the risk of people submitting arbitrary counter-criticisms just before the deadline to exclude criticisms from the bounty.
Need to address the risk of people submitting arbitrary counter-criticisms just before the deadline to exclude criticisms from the bounty.
The grace period for the initiator unfortunately does not address this risk since he may decide not to review problematic criticisms.
#3486·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoNeed to address the risk of the initiator himself being a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.
People who feel cheated can reach out to admins to report bad bounty initiators. Admins can then prevent such initiators from starting more bounties in the future.
#3486·Dennis HackethalOP revised 6 days agoNeed to address the risk of the initiator himself being a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.
There could be an additional grace period for admins to review the initiator’s selections.
The grace period prevents abuse from people other than the bounty initiator.
But the initiator himself could be a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.
Need to address the risk of the initiator himself being a bad actor who rejects pending criticisms for arbitrary reasons just to avoid paying.