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We do in every single way in which we use the term "know".

Don’t people disagree about what ‘know’ means? As in, some think it means they’re justified in their belief, others think they have corrected a sufficient amount of errors, etc…

[Deutsch] suggests that a good explanation is better than a rival if it explains more — meaning it has fewer errors, fewer loose ends, or a broader explanatory range (i.e., it accounts for more phenomena). I believe Popper also describes a solution to be better if it has less unintended consequences than a rival idea. <my interpretations, not quotes>.

Citations needed, that disclaimer not withstanding.

We cannot always be wrong. If all our ideas are false, then so is the the idea that all our ideas are false.

In the future, be sure to ‘neutralize’ a criticism when you revise it by checking the box that says “Supersedes previous version?”. Otherwise both the revision and the outdated version are counted as criticisms. Neutralizing ensures that only the most recent revision is counted as a criticism. See #1597.

You don’t need to do this again for this criticism. My counter-criticism already neutralizes it.

Avoid duplicate criticisms during revisions

When revising a criticism, check the box that says “Supersedes previous version?”. This will automatically ‘neutralize’ the older version to avoid counting a criticism twice.

They are now implemented.

Much easier to use semolina flour instead of regular flour. h/t @edwin-de-wit

Need email notifications.

We can't always be wrong, because that implies that correct ideas are not expressible, which makes no sense.

I think there is a sense in which we cannot always be sure that we are right, as there's always some possibility that we are wrong, even if we think we are completely right. And if we are completely right, there is nothing that is "manifest" about that.

Let's say I open my fridge, and there is cheese there, I conclude "I have cheese in my fridge". I may be hallucinating, or wrong about the category of cheese, or it just appears like cheese, or whatever. In that sense I could potentially be wrong. However I find it silly to think that I am infinitely wrong in my assessment of where my food is, all the time. That's like saying that we don't know what happens after we die. We do in every single way in which we use the term "know".

I think this idea that we are always wrong needs a rephrase, such as "we could always consider how we could be wrong", or "there is nothing that justifies our true belief", or "we could and should always criticise", or "nothing exists outside of criticism" (as we picked 1+1 and not 1+2 for some critical reason). The rephrase leaves open the possibility of being right a lot, like about where your food is, because you just found it, while still leaving open the possibility that the cheese you just saw is actually your butter.

as things get complex and more detailed, it becomes to know which part you are 100% right about.

I think an important consideration here is that because we have no way to prove something to be 100% (because knowledge is conjectured, not justified), that we should assume it to contain areas of improvement and can never be 100% right. The best we can do is say it's true on the condition of axioms X Y Z and the fact that I cannot think of any further criticisms.

If we use the correspondance theory of truth, then truth consists of explanations that correspond "perfectly" to reality. In that sense all our statements are false: we don't have those explanations that perfectly correspond, all our actual statements are approximations, or deductions from approximations (1+1=2 is a deduction from a set of explanations, but that set is not entirely true - since the set is inconsistent and incomplete)

The above statement is correct. But instead of "conditional" I would rather use "contextual" or at the right level of abstraction. If we're talking about math, we don't need to bring in other subjects by fiat. Within math, 1+1 = 2 is 100% true. Of course that is in the context of the things being added are identical and the + sign is said to mean "collecting" or "adding." Now, this doesn't mean 1+1=2 is unquestionable, someone might say "what if we are adding an apple and an orange?" And this also doesn't mean that we get this empirically, it is still a guess. You can also know more about it. Like Brett talks about the Peano's axiom. At that point, you are going in more detail, which might be needed if it solves your problem.

My understanding so far is fallible means anyone can be wrong, which means that there is something to be right about, and as such one can be 100% right. y as things get complex and more detailed, it becomes to know which part you are 100% right about. And at that point, you go with what solves your problem, unless your problem is finding ideas that are 100% true, in which case the best you can do is guess how that idea can be false.

There isn’t a clear logical or computational method for determining whether one explanation is better than another. However, David Deutsch offers useful criteria for evaluating explanations. He suggests that a good explanation is better than a rival if it explains more — meaning it has fewer errors, fewer loose ends, or a broader explanatory range (i.e., it accounts for more phenomena) <my interpretation, not a quote>.

The statement that “we are always wrong” is contentious, even within fallibilism. Concepts like truth and falsity, degrees of truth, or better and worse explanations all come with their own pitfalls. In this discussion, I hope we can reach a consensus on how to describe fallibilism in a way that acknowledges and addresses these challenges.

An idea can be either true or false — it’s a binary distinction, and some statements can be absolutely true. However, the critical nuance is that such truth is conditionally absolute. That is, it depends on the background knowledge and underlying assumptions or axioms. For example, 1 + 1 = 2 is absolutely true, but only within the framework of the Peano axioms.