The spirit of the Fun Criterion
#1806·Dennis Hackethal revised about 2 months agoAnother problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
For example, trivial or tautological statements aren’t knowledge, neither in the Popperian nor common sense of the word.
It’s a valid criticism, but off-topic here. In both my book and video, I define these labels specifically as types of knowledge—not as trivial utterances or noise. So the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to directly address that concern, since I’ll make it clear upfront that all of them are knowledge types.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise. Therefore, the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to address this criticism, since I’ll clarify beforehand that all are types of knowledge.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
#1863·Dennis Hackethal, about 2 months agoIn light of (at the time of writing) three outstanding criticisms of your new terminology (#1630), what do you plan to do, if anything?
Some ideas: if you disagree with the criticisms, we could discuss further; if you agree, we could come up with ways to correct the error, like (just spitballing here) revising your terminology going forward or posting disclaimers on previous publications.
Either way, it would be good to reach some sort of conclusion.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
#1700·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoMy dictionary app says for ‘statement’ (bold emphasis mine):
the expression of an idea or opinion through something other than words: their humorous kitschiness makes a statement of serious wealth.
That’s the opposite of what you mean. Another reason not to introduce new terms.
Interesting. Yes, you’re right that statement is also used figuratively—for example, in the phrase “making a statement”, where it means expressing something without words.
But the more literal definition is a clear expression in words:
Oxford English:
a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing.
Nevertheless, I think your criticism is valid: statement could indeed be misinterpreted in different ways, depending on the context.
I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.
I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.
#1731·Dennis Hackethal, 2 months agoYour new comment notwithstanding, I invite you to be more critical of your English. I’ve pointed out several issues already (which, to your credit, you did fix), and you’ve since made more mistakes (eg see #1729, and in a recent DM you wrote “criticizems”). A typo of that magnitude plausibly indicates deeper issues.
Again, I don’t mean to get too personal here – forgive me if that’s how it comes across.
I think this is off-topic because my carelessness that caused my typos had no effect on my choice of new terminology. (Derived from your suggestion in #1808)
#1630·Edwin de WitOP, 3 months agoSynonymous indeed. In a previous video I labeled Deutsch's terms to make them easier to discuss and get a better sense for. You're correct that the specific mapping I use is:
Statements = explicit knowledge
Intuitions = inexplicit knowledge
Drives = unconscious knowledge
In light of (at the time of writing) three outstanding criticisms of your new terminology (#1630), what do you plan to do, if anything?
Some ideas: if you disagree with the criticisms, we could discuss further; if you agree, we could come up with ways to correct the error, like (just spitballing here) revising your terminology going forward or posting disclaimers on previous publications.
Either way, it would be good to reach some sort of conclusion.
#1806·Dennis Hackethal revised about 2 months agoAnother problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
For example, trivial or tautological statements aren’t knowledge, neither in the Popperian nor common sense of the word.
@edwin-de-wit In light of the potential shortcomings of Deutsch’s definitions of knowledge, I’ve revised my criticism, resulting in #1806. See if you want to counter-criticize it.
#1804·Edwin de WitOP, about 2 months agoGotcha! Did my most recent edit now address the criticism that Joy isn't signaling an unaddressed conflict?
Yeah
#1801·Edwin de WitOP, about 2 months agoYeah, it doesn’t feel like a real criticism. I’m just trying to figure out the right way to resolve this thread. You’ve raised other criticisms focused on the content of my explanations—those make sense to keep open. But this thread, about my English possibly being a problem, doesn’t seem like a relevant or substantive criticism. I've claimed that my inaccuracies come more from carelessness than from a lack of comprehension of the language, and that doesn’t feel like a criticism of the ideas we’re discussing. So what should we do with this thread?
But this thread, about my English possibly being a problem, doesn’t seem like a relevant or substantive criticism.
As I’ve pointed out previously, I wouldn’t try to assign strengths (or ‘substantiveness’) to arguments.
Any criticism no matter how small destroys its target decisively if unaddressed. Whether or not its decisive is determined by whether or not there are any counter-criticisms, not by assigning some strength score (a remnant of justificationism). A criticism is decisive as long as there are no counter-criticisms. In the absence of counter-criticisms, how could it not be decisive?
In the current situation, this epistemology is actually to your benefit because, if some idea (such as #1731) is off topic, simply pointing this out in a criticism completely neutralizes the idea you deem off topic.
If a criticism really is tiny (or ‘weak’), it’s easier to just correct the error it points to than to counter-criticize. (For example, it’s usually quicker to fix a typo than to argue about the merits of pointing out typos.)
This is how Veritula is built. If you have an epistemological disagreement about its functionality or want to continue this broader epistemological discussion, submit an idea or criticism in ‘How Does Veritula Work?’.
#1801·Edwin de WitOP, about 2 months agoYeah, it doesn’t feel like a real criticism. I’m just trying to figure out the right way to resolve this thread. You’ve raised other criticisms focused on the content of my explanations—those make sense to keep open. But this thread, about my English possibly being a problem, doesn’t seem like a relevant or substantive criticism. I've claimed that my inaccuracies come more from carelessness than from a lack of comprehension of the language, and that doesn’t feel like a criticism of the ideas we’re discussing. So what should we do with this thread?
Since you asked, I suggest you do both of the following:
- Submit a criticism of #1731, suggesting that your English is off topic because the carelessness you suggest caused your typos had no effect on your choice of new terminology (‘Statements’ etc).
- Since you agree that #1738 is not a criticism, revise it to unmark it as a criticism. At the bottom of the revision form, uncheck #1799 to indicate that it does not apply anymore.
Another problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
Recall Deutsch’s definitions of knowledge (paraphrasing from memory): information with causal power; information which, once instantiated, causes itself to remain instantiated.
The sentence ‘nice weather we’re having’ is a statement but doesn’t meet those definitions of knowledge.
Another problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
For example, trivial or tautological statements aren’t knowledge, neither in the Popperian nor common sense of the word.
#1800·Edwin de WitOP, about 2 months agoInteresting, I hadn’t thought of that angle before. I’ve always taken a fairly broad view of “information with causal power,” assuming that any explicit statement from a human mind qualifies. Even the simple remark “Nice weather we’re having” can have causal power—it might prompt the listener to respond, or push the speaker to continue if the comment goes unacknowledged. In that sense, almost any statement can be read and potentially inspire another universal explainer. Even when fed into an LLM, the statement can still be parsed and worked with. In contrast, mere “information” in the form of gibberish, a made-up language, or a nonsensical string of random words would not be parsable, and therefore would not exert causal power on the parser.
I also recall Deutsch often saying that knowledge is information that tends to remain instantiated once it appears. I always understood that as a form of causal power, rather than as a separate criterion. I’m not sure he has ever been fully explicit on this point. But if he does mean it as a strict demarcation—that knowledge is only what causes itself to persist—then I’d agree with your criticism.
You make a good point. Maybe the definition ‘information with causal power’ on its own isn’t very good since virtually any statement can have causal power yet presumably even Deutsch would agree that merely saying ‘hi’ isn’t knowledge even though it can have causal power (eg prompting someone to say ‘hi’ back).
#1798·Dennis Hackethal, 2 months agoBy the way, you don’t need to put disclaimers like “Addition 01-09-2025”. The versioning system records and displays all that information automatically :)
Gotcha! Did my most recent edit now address the criticism that Joy isn't signaling an unaddressed conflict?
clarified that indeed emotions don't only signal a conflict
I think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE
Addition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.
I think it does imply a conflict. Every emotional sensation—including urges—arises to provide feedback to our consciousness about how a particular problem (in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict) is or isn’t progressing.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE
Addition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.
#1799·Dennis Hackethal, 2 months agoCool, appreciate it. Since you agree and plan to be more precise, should this really be marked as a criticism?
Yeah, it doesn’t feel like a real criticism. I’m just trying to figure out the right way to resolve this thread. You’ve raised other criticisms focused on the content of my explanations—those make sense to keep open. But this thread, about my English possibly being a problem, doesn’t seem like a relevant or substantive criticism. I've claimed that my inaccuracies come more from carelessness than from a lack of comprehension of the language, and that doesn’t feel like a criticism of the ideas we’re discussing. So what should we do with this thread?
#1794·Dennis Hackethal, 2 months agoAnother problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
Recall Deutsch’s definitions of knowledge (paraphrasing from memory): information with causal power; information which, once instantiated, causes itself to remain instantiated.
The sentence ‘nice weather we’re having’ is a statement but doesn’t meet those definitions of knowledge.
Interesting, I hadn’t thought of that angle before. I’ve always taken a fairly broad view of “information with causal power,” assuming that any explicit statement from a human mind qualifies. Even the simple remark “Nice weather we’re having” can have causal power—it might prompt the listener to respond, or push the speaker to continue if the comment goes unacknowledged. In that sense, almost any statement can be read and potentially inspire another universal explainer. Even when fed into an LLM, the statement can still be parsed and worked with. In contrast, mere “information” in the form of gibberish, a made-up language, or a nonsensical string of random words would not be parsable, and therefore would not exert causal power on the parser.
I also recall Deutsch often saying that knowledge is information that tends to remain instantiated once it appears. I always understood that as a form of causal power, rather than as a separate criterion. I’m not sure he has ever been fully explicit on this point. But if he does mean it as a strict demarcation—that knowledge is only what causes itself to persist—then I’d agree with your criticism.
#1738·Edwin de WitOP, 2 months agoI don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.
Cool, appreciate it. Since you agree and plan to be more precise, should this really be marked as a criticism?
#1741·Edwin de WitOP revised 2 months agoI think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzREAddition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.
By the way, you don’t need to put disclaimers like “Addition 01-09-2025”. The versioning system records and displays all that information automatically :)
#1741·Edwin de WitOP revised 2 months agoI think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzREAddition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.
#1630·Edwin de WitOP, 3 months agoSynonymous indeed. In a previous video I labeled Deutsch's terms to make them easier to discuss and get a better sense for. You're correct that the specific mapping I use is:
Statements = explicit knowledge
Intuitions = inexplicit knowledge
Drives = unconscious knowledge
Another problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
Recall Deutsch’s definitions of knowledge (paraphrasing from memory): information with causal power; information which, once instantiated, causes itself to remain instantiated.
The sentence ‘nice weather we’re having’ is a statement but doesn’t meet those definitions of knowledge.
I think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE
I think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.
For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.
I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE
Addition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.
It's a fair point. I agree it's not a perfect word. I tried many labels and variations, but I ended up with Drives because in my view it contrasted well with Intuition:
Unlike Intuitions, Drives carry the sense of a deep urge whose underlying theory is largely unconscious. You’re aware of the feelings they produce as you say, but not of the reasoning behind them. For example, you might know you’re sexually attracted to someone or suddenly feel sad, yet have no idea why — then that’s a Drive.
If you do have some sense of why you’re feeling a certain way and can roughly express it in words, it’s an Intuition. If you can fully articulate it in words, it’s a Statement. Statements can also produce feelings. For example, if one of your core value is non‑coercion, you might feel angry when someone disciplines their child in an immoral way — here, the Statement (often paired with Intuitions or Drives) is producing the feeling of anger.
I agree the main shortcoming of Drive is that it’s often taken to mean innate or hardwired knowledge. I haven’t found a better alternative, so I make it clear when explaining the concept that Drives can also arise from habitualized knowledge. Deutsch (in this podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5e2LWxaqQUQ) seems to also support this way of defining new terminology
If you want to say something new the terminology you use is going to be unsuited for it because the terminology is going to be adapted to previous ways of thinking um what you can do is just invent your own terminology that's a terrible idea because no one will understand what you're saying and secondly it is subject to the same problem that it will only represent accurately fairly accurately your thoughts at a particular time when you're addressing a new criticism it will no longer be suitable so I think what people usually do and what is done in physics and what's done in philosophy what Popper did is to use the nearest existing term and be very careful to explain that one means something new by it.
If you have alternate suggestions, I'm of course eager to hear them!
It's a fair point. I agree it's not a perfect word. I tried many labels and variations, but I ended up with Drives because in my view it contrasted well with Intuition:
Unlike Intuitions, Drives carry the sense of a deep urge whose underlying theory is largely unconscious. You’re aware of the feelings they produce as you say, but not of the reasoning behind them. For example, you might know you’re sexually attracted to someone or suddenly feel sad, yet have no idea why — then that’s a Drive.
If you do have some sense of why you’re feeling a certain way and can roughly express it in words, it’s an Intuition. If you can fully articulate it in words, it’s a Statement. Statements can also produce feelings. For example, if one of your core values is non‑coercion, you might feel angry when someone disciplines their child in an immoral way — here, the Statement (often paired with Intuitions or Drives) is producing the feeling of anger.
I agree the main shortcoming of Drive is that it’s often taken to mean innate or hardwired knowledge. I haven’t found a better alternative, so I make it clear when explaining the concept that Drives can also arise from habitualized knowledge. Deutsch (in this podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5e2LWxaqQUQ) seems to also support this way of defining new terminology
If you want to say something new the terminology you use is going to be unsuited for it because the terminology is going to be adapted to previous ways of thinking um what you can do is just invent your own terminology that's a terrible idea because no one will understand what you're saying and secondly it is subject to the same problem that it will only represent accurately fairly accurately your thoughts at a particular time when you're addressing a new criticism it will no longer be suitable so I think what people usually do and what is done in physics and what's done in philosophy what Popper did is to use the nearest existing term and be very careful to explain that one means something new by it.
If you have alternate suggestions, I'm of course eager to hear them!
#1731·Dennis Hackethal, 2 months agoYour new comment notwithstanding, I invite you to be more critical of your English. I’ve pointed out several issues already (which, to your credit, you did fix), and you’ve since made more mistakes (eg see #1729, and in a recent DM you wrote “criticizems”). A typo of that magnitude plausibly indicates deeper issues.
Again, I don’t mean to get too personal here – forgive me if that’s how it comes across.
I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.