Edwin de Wit

good idea!

Gotcha! Did my most recent edit now address the criticism that Joy isn't signaling an unaddressed conflict?

Yeah, it doesn’t feel like a real criticism. I’m just trying to figure out the right way to resolve this thread. You’ve raised other criticisms focused on the content of my explanations—those make sense to keep open. But this thread, about my English possibly being a problem, doesn’t seem like a relevant or substantive criticism. I've claimed that my inaccuracies come more from carelessness than from a lack of comprehension of the language, and that doesn’t feel like a criticism of the ideas we’re discussing. So what should we do with this thread?

Interesting, I hadn’t thought of that angle before. I’ve always taken a fairly broad view of “information with causal power,” assuming that any explicit statement from a human mind qualifies. Even the simple remark “Nice weather we’re having” can have causal power—it might prompt the listener to respond, or push the speaker to continue if the comment goes unacknowledged. In that sense, almost any statement can be read and potentially inspire another universal explainer. Even when fed into an LLM, the statement can still be parsed and worked with. In contrast, mere “information” in the form of gibberish, a made-up language, or a nonsensical string of random words would not be parsable, and therefore would not exert causal power on the parser.

I also recall Deutsch often saying that knowledge is information that tends to remain instantiated once it appears. I always understood that as a form of causal power, rather than as a separate criterion. I’m not sure he has ever been fully explicit on this point. But if he does mean it as a strict demarcation—that knowledge is only what causes itself to persist—then I’d agree with your criticism.

I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.

I’ve added a comment on #1704 to clarify my point. I don’t think my English is the issue here. If/where we disagree, it’s more likely due to a gap in mutual understanding or an error in the substance of my knowledge.

Thanks fixed

Adjusted it

What I mean is this: if you feel sadness without having any conscious theory in mind—whether explicit or inexplicit—then the sadness must arise from a conflict or problem (in the Popperian sense) involving unconscious knowledge, i.e. a Drive.

I do not mean that the feeling of sadness is a Drive. Rather, I’m saying that when sadness appears without an accompanying theory to explain it, its source must be a Drive.

I see — so the criticism was about my use of the label Statements for “explicit knowledge,” rather than about whether explicit knowledge can produce feelings (which I take it you agree it can).

I agree with these points; I was simply using Statement as my label for explicit knowledge.

Some written words on a page or recordings of a voice don’t by themselves produce feelings. Expressions don’t produce feelings. If they’re just sitting on a page, they’re not even inside a mind where they could produce feelings.
A poem might move you to tears but it’s not literally the written words that move you to tears. It’s some knowledge inside you that does.

I think it does imply a conflict. I think every emotional sensation — including urges — arises from problems in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict.

For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.

I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE

Done

A typo, I think. Fixed now!

The part where I describe the conscious feeling or sensation may sound like an urge, but I use the term Drive because a Drive is not always consciously experienced. Drives are forms of unconscious knowledge that cause many automatic actions and effects, most of which occur without our awareness. An “urge” only arises when a Drive comes into conflict with something else. This is why I find Drive remains the more fitting term.

I agree with what you said, but don't understand why it's a criticism or refutation of "Statements can also produce feelings". Values are largely explicit knowledge (what I call Statements), and they can produce feelings, as you say.