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This seems to me to be the same distinction that Deutsch and others have made between the genetic evolution we can simulate through evolutionary algorithms and the kind we actually observe in nature. I think it would be helpful to investigate evolutionary algorithms a bit further if you want to develop a clear distinction. This is how I describe it in my book:

There are several mechanisms that genes use to create variants, including sex, mutation, gene flow, and genetic drift, all of which appear to introduce change randomly. But we now know it cannot be entirely random. Something more is shaping what gets trialed, because when we model and simulate evolution using random changes, we never see the sort of novelties that arose in nature. We see optimization. We see exploitation. We see organisms become better at using resources they already use. But we never see a genuinely new use of a resource emerge. A fin may become better at swimming, but it does not become a limb. A metabolism may become more efficient, but it does not open up an entirely new biological pathway. And yet the natural world is full of exactly such extraordinary adaptations.

I could indeed have been clearer. The point isn’t that using creativity to re-establish direction is the distinguishing feature. The distinction is the method of conflict resolution.

In a non-coercive, rational resolution, you take the distraction or impulse seriously, examine its content, and form a theory of what problem it’s signaling. Then you conjecture candidate solutions and select one to try. A common solution is to acknowledge the distraction and explicitly schedule it for later, which removes the unfinished business feeling it creates in the moment. Direction returns because the conflict got resolved.

In self-coercion, the method is irrational and coercive: you don’t examine the content of the distraction at all. You steamroll it or swat it away. You may regain direction, but the underlying problem remains unresolved.

Both methods cost creativity, but the coercive one causes more downstream problems (maybe even suffering), which then requires further creative expenditure to be resolved in the future.

Focus is usually defined in coercive terms—working without distraction or despite it. This framing sneaks discipline in through the side door.

• Deep Work: Focus is the ability to concentrate on cognitively demanding tasks without distraction.
• Indistractable: Focus is doing what you intend to do despite internal and external distractions.
• Hyperfocus: Focus is intentionally directing attention while deliberately ignoring everything else.

What all of these share is the assumption that focus is valuable because it resists distraction. Distraction is treated as interference to be pushed aside.

I think this coercive component should be removed. At the same time, empirical experience makes it clear that people do differ in their ability to stay engaged—and that this ability can be trained. So something real is being gestured at, but mischaracterized.

Here is my Deutsch-compatible explanation of it:

Focus is the stickiness of engagement with a chosen problem.
It is not about heroic self-control—suppressing distractions or forcefully pushing competing thoughts away—but about how reliably engagement sustains itself without requiring repeated creative intervention. Creativity enables intentional action; focus determines how often that intentionality needs to be actively renewed.
When focus is weak, engagement is fragile. Minor distractions, impulses, or shifts in attention repeatedly pull us away, forcing creativity to be spent again and again just to re-establish intentional direction.
When focus is strong, engagement is stickier. The threshold for a distraction to take hold is higher. Distractions still occur, but they are rarer. And when they do arise, they are less disruptive, because our sticky focus allows us to handle them using sound judgment rather than succumbing to poor judgment.
Focus is a capacity we can train like any other skill. Periods of sustained engagement stretch that capacity, and—when followed by adequate recovery—our ability to stay engaged grows stronger

This reframing preserves what the popular literature gets right—that sustained attention exists and matters—while rejecting its coercive foundation. It replaces self-war with problem-solving, and willpower myths with creativity and judgment.

I would love to hear criticisms of this theory of focus. It is a core part of my book and, I believe, a necessary incorporation into a Deutschian / TCS view of the mind—one that fully addresses and refutes the popular focus literature referenced above.

Extra context for those interested

Most models of the mind are wrong. They treat distractions as inevitable annoyances—exploitable bugs in our evolutionary wiring—that must be overridden rather than understood. The supposed antidote is to train the ability to overcome distractions. On this view, willpower, self-control or grit is required for success: something you must strengthen so you can push through resistance. We are at war with our own minds, and many things simply suck and must be endured. Discipline = freedom.

From a Deutschian / TCS perspective, this framing is deeply mistaken. Distractions are not mere inevitabilities. They are signals—indicators that something may be wrong or misaligned. Taking those signals seriously is rational; dismissing them merely because they are “distractions” is irrational. The relevant question is not how to suppress them, but what problem they might be pointing to.

Addressing such problems does not consume willpower. It consumes creativity. Creativity is — among other things — the currency of intentional action: generating and criticizing ideas about what to do next. When we force ourselves through distraction-signals, we spend creativity to override our own warning systems—and train ourselves not to trust our minds.

Optimizing for ever-stronger defensive strategies is therefore a poor strategy. It amounts to stockpiling and mobilizing massive amounts of valuable creativity in order to do something harmful: coercing yourself through unresolved conflicts. Hyper-discipline can work —the army being an obvious example—but it often achieves productivity by damaging the inner environment, suppressing signals rather than resolving their causes.

A more effective optimization target is a life in which unwanted distractions arise less often. This shifts attention away from defense and toward shaping what we do and how we do it so fewer internal conflicts arise in the first place. And when distractions do occur, we should deal with them through rational sound judgment—by resolving the underlying problems—rather than swatting them away only for them to cause more damage and come back even fiercer.

Yes, but that inhirent in biology (evolution) right? I see it as part of the evolutionary strand for this reason.

I currently see Constructor Theory as a meta-theory. A different mode of explanation. But it raises an interesting question: does CT actually qualify as a deeper theory than the four strands? Even if we were to express all four strands in constructor-theoretic terms, that alone wouldn’t make it explain more or have greater reach. So when would it truly deserve to be considered a strand/theory of everything?

I see where the confusion comes from, but I thought clarifying my current view in #2073 already addressed the criticism. What else would you suggest I do?

Deutsch says our body of knowledge keeps growing both deeper—better explanations—and wider—new fields, more facts, rules of thumb. He thinks depth is winning. It might be interesting to asses what that balance looks like in 2025.

Perhaps it’s premature, but I’d love to discuss:

1. why DD thinks the four strands already amount to a theory of everything

2. why DD presents quantum mechanisms as having already subsumed general relativity

3. what other (proto)strands we could envision and why they are indeed a meaningful addition to the 4 strands

Makes sense. I’ve noticed you often refer to your blog posts or Veritula ideas during arguments.

Great point! It's a good reminder to always avoid positive arguments. By extension, if Veritula would require a specific format or mode of criticism, we’d fall into the very error Popper warns about with the Myth of the Framework—the mistaken belief that criticism requires a shared framework or language. So, Veritula should remain as it is.

At most, you might consider adding guidelines on what constitutes good versus poor criticism, so that critics can improve their skills. But I agree: the person who created the idea should remain solely responsible for addressing the criticisms they receive, not dismissing them as “bad” and moving on.

Thanks for clarifying! I changed the text to phrase it as counter-criticize because that's indeed more accurate here.

It’s a valid criticism, but off-topic here. In both my book and video, I define these labels specifically as types of knowledge—not as trivial utterances or noise. So the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to directly address that concern, since I’ll make it clear upfront that all of them are knowledge types.

Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.

Problems with Statement

1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.

2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.

3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise. Therefore, the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to address this criticism, since I’ll clarify beforehand that all are types of knowledge.

Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.

Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.

Interesting. Yes, you’re right that statement is also used figuratively—for example, in the phrase “making a statement”, where it means expressing something without words.

But the more literal definition is a clear expression in words:

Oxford English:

a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing.

Nevertheless, I think your criticism is valid: statement could indeed be misinterpreted in different ways, depending on the context.

I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.

I think this is off-topic because my carelessness that caused my typos had no effect on my choice of new terminology. (Derived from your suggestion in #1808)

good idea!

Gotcha! Did my most recent edit now address the criticism that Joy isn't signaling an unaddressed conflict?

I think it does imply a conflict. Every emotional sensation—including urges—arises to provide feedback to our consciousness about how a particular problem (in the Popperian sense: two or more incompatible theories in conflict) is or isn’t progressing.

For example, consider hunger. One theory (Drive A) is that we don’t want to be hungry, while another signals that we are hungry (from ephemeral sense data (which could itself be viewed as a Drive, though that’s not important here)). The conflict between these theories produces the urge — in this case, the sensation of hunger.

I explain these conflicts in more detail, with further examples of Drives, Intuitions, and Statements, in this video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEcR_0GbzRE

Addition 01-09-2025:
In the case of hunger, the sensation was signaling an unaddressed problem, but as you correctly pointed out, not all emotions signal unaddressed problems. Emotions are a feedback mechanism that can reflect different stages of problem solving. For instance, joy may signal a resolved problem, and impatience might signal frustration with an ongoing one. Likewise, anxiety can serve as an early warning of potential obstacles ahead, while relief marks the successful removal of a previously pressing issue.

Interesting, I hadn’t thought of that angle before. I’ve always taken a fairly broad view of “information with causal power,” assuming that any explicit statement from a human mind qualifies. Even the simple remark “Nice weather we’re having” can have causal power—it might prompt the listener to respond, or push the speaker to continue if the comment goes unacknowledged. In that sense, almost any statement can be read and potentially inspire another universal explainer. Even when fed into an LLM, the statement can still be parsed and worked with. In contrast, mere “information” in the form of gibberish, a made-up language, or a nonsensical string of random words would not be parsable, and therefore would not exert causal power on the parser.

I also recall Deutsch often saying that knowledge is information that tends to remain instantiated once it appears. I always understood that as a form of causal power, rather than as a separate criterion. I’m not sure he has ever been fully explicit on this point. But if he does mean it as a strict demarcation—that knowledge is only what causes itself to persist—then I’d agree with your criticism.

It's a fair point. I agree it's not a perfect word. I tried many labels and variations, but I ended up with Drives because in my view it contrasted well with Intuition:

Unlike Intuitions, Drives carry the sense of a deep urge whose underlying theory is largely unconscious. You’re aware of the feelings they produce as you say, but not of the reasoning behind them. For example, you might know you’re sexually attracted to someone or suddenly feel sad, yet have no idea why — then that’s a Drive.

If you do have some sense of why you’re feeling a certain way and can roughly express it in words, it’s an Intuition. If you can fully articulate it in words, it’s a Statement. Statements can also produce feelings. For example, if one of your core values is non‑coercion, you might feel angry when someone disciplines their child in an immoral way — here, the Statement (often paired with Intuitions or Drives) is producing the feeling of anger.

I agree the main shortcoming of Drive is that it’s often taken to mean innate or hardwired knowledge. I haven’t found a better alternative, so I make it clear when explaining the concept that Drives can also arise from habitualized knowledge. Deutsch (in this podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5e2LWxaqQUQ) seems to also support this way of defining new terminology

If you want to say something new the terminology you use is going to be unsuited for it because the terminology is going to be adapted to previous ways of thinking um what you can do is just invent your own terminology that's a terrible idea because no one will understand what you're saying and secondly it is subject to the same problem that it will only represent accurately fairly accurately your thoughts at a particular time when you're addressing a new criticism it will no longer be suitable so I think what people usually do and what is done in physics and what's done in philosophy what Popper did is to use the nearest existing term and be very careful to explain that one means something new by it.

If you have alternate suggestions, I'm of course eager to hear them!

If I were having a technical discussion with DD, Lulie, or you, I’d stick with those terms, since they’re the most technically accurate and you already understand them. However, when explaining the different types of knowledge to people who don’t quite grasp it yet or struggle to picture what it is, I’ve found that these labels help. These labels already have a meaning that is more commonly associated to sensations in the mind.

I’ve added a comment on #1704 to clarify my point. I don’t think my English is the issue here. If/where we disagree, it’s more likely due to a gap in mutual understanding or an error in the substance of my knowledge.

Thanks fixed